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INTRODUCTION 
Time named the “silence breakers”—women who have bravely spoken out 
against sexual assault in myriad workplaces and contexts, and launched the 
#MeToo movement—the “Person of the Year” in 2017.1 The Time cover story 
quite literally brought the ongoing “reckoning” of women victims standing up 
to abusers to the forefront: “[Women have] had it with the fear of retaliation, 
of being blackballed . . . . They’ve had it with the code of going along to get 
along. They’ve had it with men who use their power to take what they want 
from women.”2 This narrative—and the general reckoning of #MeToo—failed 
to consider, however, the plight of one of America’s most at-risk populations 
suffering unabated sexual abuse: incarcerated women.3 
That incarcerated women experience the traumas of sexual assault and 
abuse by male guards is not new.4 According to the U.S. Department of 
Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), allegations of sexual misconduct 
in prisons are on the rise, and approximately half of reported sexual assaults 
are allegedly perpetrated by guards against inmates.5 According to a January 
2014 BJS report, “[F]emales account for a greater proportion of victims of 
staff-on-inmate victimization than they do in the overall inmate population.”6 
The prevalence of reported incidents of sexual assault by guards on inmates 
is certainly troubling, but it fails to illustrate the truly horrifying nature of 
guard-on-inmate sexual assault.7 While underreporting in the general 
 
1 Stephanie Zacharek, Eliana Dockterman & Haley Sweetland Edwards, The Silence Breakers, 
TIME (Dec. 18, 2017), http://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-2017-silence-breakers/. 
2 Id. 
3 See Cindy Struckman-Johnson et al., Sexual Coercion Reported by Men and Women in Prison, 33 J. SEX 
RES. 67, 68 (1996) (“As a consequence of . . . [a] lack of research, conclusive data on the prevalence of 
prison assault are unavailable. . . . However, even the most conservative estimates of prisoner sexual assault 
rates translate into a high number of victims among inmate populations nationwide.” (citation omitted)). 
4 Samiera Saliba, Rape by the System: The Existence and Effects of Sexual Abuse of Women in United 
States Prisons, 10 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 293, 323 (2013); see also M. Dyan McGuire, The 
Empirical and Legal Realities Surrounding Staff Perpetrated Sexual Abuse of Inmates, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. 
428, 431-32 (2010) (“Historically, the concern about inmate and staff sexual contact was primarily 
directed at male guards sexually assaulting female inmates. This concern was well-founded.”). 
5 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION REPORTED BY ADULT 
CORRECTIONAL AUTHORITIES, 2009–11 1 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/svraca0911.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/564M-VSL7]. 
6 Id. at 12. 
7 See Kim Shayo Buchanan, Impunity: Sexual Abuse in Women’s Prisons, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 45, 51 (2007) (“Sexual abuse is well known to be severely underreported, both inside and 
outside prison.”); see also Hannah Brenner, Kathleen Darcy, Gina Fedock & Sheryl Kubiak, Bars to 
Justice: The Impact of Rape Myths on Women in Prison, 17 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 521, 555 (2016) (“The 
reality both inside and outside prison is that sexual violence is a highly underreported crime. 
National data suggests that only 8% of prisoners report their sexual victimization during 
incarceration.” (footnote omitted)). 
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population makes incidents of sexual assault difficult to quantify, this 
phenomenon is especially acute in the custodial context,  
The reasons for underreporting of sexual assault on the outside are redoubled in 
prison. Women cannot trust that their reports will remain confidential, concerns 
about retaliation are very real, they feel that the process is stacked against them, and 
they continue to be at the mercy of their abusers, with no opportunity for escape.8  
Even when female inmates do report the guards who abuse them, their 
complaints are subject to vigorous scrutiny designed to either deter reporting 
entirely or to make cases so difficult to sustain that civil claims or criminal charges 
are only rarely brought successfully.9 
In 2003, Congress passed the Prison Rape Elimination Act (the “PREA”), 
which set forth various policies and provisions aimed at ending custodial sexual 
assault.10 The PREA “mandated data collection about prison rape as defined by 
the state,”11 created a “zero tolerance” policy for “all forms of sexual abuse and 
sexual harassment,” and required the implementation of “PREA coordinator[s]” 
whose responsibility it would be “to develop, implement, and oversee agency 
efforts to comply with the PREA standards in all of its facilities.”12 However, the 
PREA “does not contain any significant new initiatives to end the sexual 
victimization of incarcerated women . . . . In fact, the administrative rules 
implementing the PREA candidly acknowledge it may have no measurable effect 
whatsoever.”13 The continued prevalence of guard-on-inmate sexual assault 
demonstrates the PREA’s ineffectiveness.14 This Comment undertakes to explore 
 
8 Buchanan, supra note 7, at 66-67. 
9 See Alysia Santo, Preying on Prisoners: In Texas, Staffers Rarely Go to Jail for Sexually Abusing 
Inmates, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (June 17, 2015), https://www.themarshall
project.org/2015/06/17/preying-on-prisoners [https://perma.cc/7KW8-RVPU] (“But even where 
there is enough evidence to prove a staff member had sexual contact with an inmate, criminal 
sanctions are rare. Fewer than half are referred for prosecution. Accountability dwindles further 
from there.”); see also Buchanan, supra note 7, at 65-66 (describing “corroboration requirement[s]” 
that make reporting sexual abuse by prison guards extremely dangerous and that create further 
obstacles to meaningful accountability); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 5, at 5 (“The 
most common outcome of investigations was a determination that the evidence was insufficient to 
show whether the alleged incident occurred, i.e., the allegation was unsubstantiated.”). 
10 28 C.F.R. § 115 (2018); see also NATIONAL PREA RESOURCE CENTER, https://www.prearesource
center.org/about/prison-rape-elimination-act-prea [https://perma.cc/WD7J-H4UU] (last visited Dec. 5, 2017). 
11 Michelle VanNatta, Conceptualizing and Stopping State Sexual Violence Against Incarcerated 
Women, 37 SOC. JUST. 27, 30 (2010). 
12 28 C.F.R. §§ 115.11(a)–(b). 
13 David W. Frank, Abandoned: Abolishing Female Prisons To Prevent Sexual Abuse and Herald an 
End to Incarceration, 29 BERKELEY J. GENDER, L. & JUST. 1, 13 (2014) 
14 See Cierra Simpson, Comment, Inevitable Horrors: Sexual Assault in Prison, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
145, 164 (2015) (“PREA has not accomplished its goals because inmate sexual assault is too large of an issue 
to control without additional help.”). See generally Julie K. Brown, Bartered Sex, Corruption and Cover-Ups 
Behind Bars in Nation’s Largest Women’s Prison, MIAMI HERALD (Dec. 13, 2015), http://www.miami
herald.com/news/special-reports/florida-prisons/article49175685.html; Joseph Goldstein, Brooklyn Prison 
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the feasibility of criminal liability for guards who sexually assault women inmates, 
given the PREA’s general failure to slow or stop sexual violence in prisons.15 
Given the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),16 which seeks to curb 
prisoner civil litigation in federal courts, and the PREA’s ineffectiveness, 
criminal redress is a possible, if unlikely, avenue for incarcerated women to seek 
recourse for the sexual harms they suffer during their terms of imprisonment. 
While criminal complaints are possible in theory, they prove improbable in 
practice given the procedural and systemic challenges to prisoners bringing 
successful legal claims generally, and to incarcerated persons—especially 
women—making out criminal complaints against guards for sexual violence in 
particular. The myriad hurdles that combine to make criminal redress difficult 
to imagine in this context—including the lack of a criminal pro se equivalent 
and prosecutorial discretion that dictates criminal proceedings in the United 
States, as well as general credibility issues and power dynamics—have not 
rendered all attempts at imposing criminal liability entirely futile. Mechanisms 
and procedures could be made more robust in order to make criminal 
complaints a more effective and promising mode of redress for women who are 
sexually assaulted while incarcerated. Furthermore, if criminal prosecutions are 
pursued and terms of incarceration for assailant-guards are actually handed 
down, criminal punishments against guards who assault female inmates may act 
as a deterrent of male-guard-on-female-inmate sexual violence.17 
This Comment proceeds as follows: Part I further identifies the problem of 
male guards sexually assaulting female inmates and discusses some of the 
underlying power dynamics at issue in the prison context. Part II identifies legal 
barriers that inmates face to accessing the courts, including the PLRA, and Part 
III discusses existing remedies and modes of civil recourse. Part IV considers 
criminal redress as a path to improve the prospect of holding guards accountable 
 
Supervisors Charged with Sexually Assaulting Inmates, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2017), https://www.ny
times.com/2017/05/25/nyregion/prison-supervisors-sex-abuse-prevention-rape charges.html?mcubz=1. 
15 This Comment does not address the PREA in detail, but rather begins with the assumption that it 
has been largely ineffective. For more comprehensive and helpful reviews of the PREA, see Robert W. 
Dumond, Confronting America’s Most Ignored Crime Problem: The Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, 31 J. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 354, 358 (2003); Maureen Brocco, Note, Facing the Facts: The Guarantee Against Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment in Light of PLRA, Iqbal, and PREA, 16 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 917, 939-43 (2013). 
16 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012). 
17 This Comment is limited in scope to discussing male guards’ sexual abuse of female inmates. 
Male-guard-on-male-inmate and inmate-on-inmate sexual violence are certainly problems, as is, 
assuredly, female-guard-on-male-inmate violence.  
Cases claiming rapes or other serious assaults by female guards against male inmates are 
exceedingly rare . . . . By contrast, there are many cases involving female inmates and male 
guards replete with confirmed instances of serious rape or forcible sexual assault . . . . In 
addition to heterosexual assaults, inmates are also at risk of sexual abuse by same-sex guards.  
McGuire, supra note 4, at 432.  
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for sexually assaulting female inmates. Part V concludes by exploring how 
feminist legal advocacy might address the issues identified in this Comment. 
I. UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM 
Sexual assaults perpetrated by male prison guards against female inmates are 
endemic to the American carceral system.18 Academics and the news media alike 
consistently report that “[d]espite the fact that all forms of staff and inmate sexual 
conduct are illegal or at least administratively proscribed and awareness that all 
prisoners are potential victims of such abuse has begun to dawn, such assaults have 
not abated.”19 Indeed, “[w]omen are disproportionately sexually abused by prison 
staff. Nationwide, they represent 7% of all prisoners, yet they account for 33% of 
staff-on-inmate victims, according to the latest Justice Department study.”20 Sexual 
abuse in this context manifests in various forms, ranging from namecalling and 
“[v]erbal harassment” to forcible rape.21 The nature and structure of women’s 
prisons, where predominantly male guards are given virtually complete control over 
women who have nowhere to hide from abusers, and the inherent power dynamics 
in these institutions, helpfully explain the particular problem of guard-on-inmate 
sexual violence.22 As Lora Bex Lempert argues, incarcerated “[w]omen, under the 
best of circumstances, are at the mercy of the officers who guard them.”23 
A. Gender and Intersectional Hierarchies 
Female prison populations, along with the general mass incarceration 
problem in the United States, have exploded.24 The Sentencing Project 
 
18 Saliba, supra note 4, at 323 (“Sexual abuse of imprisoned women . . . has become part of the 
prison sentence on a de facto basis.”). 
19 McGuire, supra note 4, at 4; see also Brown, supra note 14 (documenting multiple abuses by 
guard, but concluding that “perhaps the worst indignity of all, women say, is that the officers—both 
male and female—use their positions of power to pressure inmates to have sex and to perform 
indecent acts.”); VanNatta, supra note 11, at 30 (“Studies show that the rate of sexual violence against 
those in women’s prisons is significant, even as forms and rates vary.”). 
20 Santo, supra note 9. 
21 For a comprehensive “continuum of staff sexual misconduct,” see BARBARA OWEN, JAMES 
WELLS, & JOCELYN POLLOCK, IN SEARCH OF SAFETY: CONFRONTING INEQUALITY IN 
WOMEN’S IMPRISONMENT 156-164 (2017). 
22 Amy Laderberg, The “Dirty Little Secret”: Why Class Actions Have Emerged as the Only Viable 
Option for Women Inmates Attempting To Satisfy the Subjective Prong of the Eighth Amendment in Suits for 
Custodial Sexual Abuse, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 323, 324 (1998). 
23 LORA BEX LEMPERT, WOMEN DOING LIFE: GENDER, PUNISHMENT, AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR IDENTITY 170 (2016). 
24 Incarcerated Women and Girls, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (Nov. 2015), 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Incarcerated-Women-and-Girls.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HJJ4-9VV3]; see also INSIDE THIS PLACE, NOT OF IT: NARRATIVES FROM 
WOMEN’S PRISONS 12 (Robin Levi & Ayelet Waldman eds., 2011) (“Today, women are the fastest 
growing segment of the prison population, and the most vulnerable.”). The Prison Policy Initiative 
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reports that “[b]etween 1980 and 2014, the number of incarcerated women 
increased by more than 700%, rising from a total of 26,378 in 1980 to 222,061 
in 2014.”25 Despite the increase in female inmates, most prison staff are 
men.26 Early women’s prisons were staffed solely by female guards.27 
Separating men and women inmates in single-gender facilities staffed by 
guards of the same sex continued until 1972, at which time Title VII 
“protections against sex-based job discrimination . . . were extended to state 
employees, including those who were employed by the states’ prison 
systems. Female correctional officers successfully used the protections 
contained in Title VII to obtain access to jobs in male prisons . . . .”28 
However, this also meant that male prison guards could marshal Title VII 
to obtain employment opportunities in women’s correctional facilities.29 
To work in prisons housing inmates of the opposite sex, both male and 
female corrections officers have argued that gender is not a bona fide 
occupational qualification (BFOQ).30 Pursuant to Title VII, to establish that 
gender is a BFOQ, corrections departments “must show a high correlation 
between sex and ability to perform job functions.”31 In Dothard v. Rawlinson, 
the Supreme Court held that Alabama’s “statutory height and weight standards 
had a discriminatory impact on women applicants” to work as prison guards 
in male correctional facilities,32 but being male was a BFOQ “for the job of 
correctional counselor in a ‘contact’ position in an Alabama male maximum-
security penitentiary.”33 Courts since Dothard have cited it to note that the 
 
reports that there were 219,000 women incarcerated in the United States as of 2017. See Aleks Kajstura, 
Women’s Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2017, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (Oct. 19, 2017), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2017women.html [https://perma.cc/RC9H-ANKQ]. 
25 Incarcerated Women and Girls, supra note 24. 
26 See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, STAFF GENDER (2017), https://www.bop.gov/about/
statistics/statistics_staff_gender.jsp [https://perma.cc/2YUY-GYYN] (reporting that 72.9% of prison 
staff are men, while 27.1% are women). 
27 See Brenda V. Smith, Rethinking Prison Sex: Self-Expression and Safety, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER 
& L. 185, 198 (2006) (discussing the nineteenth century prison reform movement to separate male 
and female inmates into single-gender correctional facilities: “One of the major characteristics of 
the Reform Movement was the establishment of separate prisons for women. These prisons were 
often directed and managed by all-female staff.”). 
28 McGuire, supra note 4. 
29 See OWEN ET AL., supra note 21, at 136 (noting that when women prison staff sued for equal 
employment in men’s prisons, “men too gained the right to work in women’s facilities”). 
30 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2 (2012). 
31 Breiner v. Nev. Dep’t. of Corr., 610 F.3d 1202, 1213 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Teamsters Local Union No. 117 v. Wash. Dep’t. of Corr., 789 F.3d 979, 987 (9th 
Cir. 2015) (“Although limited gender discrimination may be permissible in the prison employment 
context, prison administrators do not get a free pass. The Department must have an objective ‘basis 
in fact’ for its belief that gender discrimination is ‘reasonably necessary . . .’” (citation omitted)). 
32 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977). 
33 Id. at 336-37. 
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particular prison conditions that made gender a BFOQ there were “atypical,” 
and have required correctional facilities “to identify a concrete, logical basis 
for concluding that gender restrictions are ‘reasonably necessary.’”34 
Male prison guards and their unions have made successful claims that 
gender could not be the basis for assignments to correctional facilities, because 
gender in this context could not be a BFOQ. In a 2004 case, the Southern 
District of New York held that gender-based assignments of guards to prison 
facilities could not be maintained as a BFOQ.35 The court there noted,  
[C]ontrolling precedent does not permit gender-based discrimination in 
order to prevent hypothetical safety risks posed by a small percentage of male 
correction officers, even to the extent the likely wrongdoers are 
undetectable ex ante. A valid BFOQ defense requires a factual showing that 
“all or substantially all” members of the targeted group would be “unable to 
perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved.”36 
The court found Westchester County’s justification for gender-segregated 
staffing unconvincing because the county based its argument on a few “incidents 
involving four officers” and thus “failed to establish that all or substantially all 
male correction officers pose a risk of inappropriate sexual conduct with female 
inmates to justify a complete ban.”37 Westchester County was one of many cases 
where a court so held for male corrections officers.38 As a result of this litigation, 
“[i]n many states, men now make up the majority of custodial staff.”39 
Male guards working in women’s correctional facilities engender a uniquely 
predatory environment.40 Where male guards are responsible for—and have 
 
34 Breiner, 610 F.3d at 1212; see also Henry v. Milwaukee Cty., 539 F.3d 573, 579 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Dothard for the proposition that “the [BFOQ] defense is ‘meant to be an extremely narrow 
exception to the general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex.’”). 
35 Westchester Cty. Corr. v. Cty. of Westchester, 346 F. Supp. 2d 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
36 Id. at 534 (citation omitted). 
37 Id. at 534-35. 
38 See, e.g., Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210, 1216-17 (2d Cir. 1980) (vacating the district court’s 
determination that male guards could not work the evening shift at a women’s prison; women inmates’ 
complaints of violations of their privacy could not outweigh Title VII concerns where the prison 
facility was willing “to make necessary changes to eliminate the opportunity for viewing . . . that 
impair the privacy of the inmates during the nighttime hours.”); Edwards v. Dep’t. of Corr., 615 F. 
Supp. 804, 809 (M.D. Ala. 1985) (finding a male prison official’s sex not a bona fide occupational 
qualification that defendants could use to justify not promoting him in a women’s correctional 
facility). Notably, some circuits do hold that gender can be a BFOQ in women’s prisons in particular. 
See, e.g., Teamsters Local Union No. 117 v. Wash. Dep’t. of Corr., 789 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(collecting cases from the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, noting that “we and other 
circuits similarly have upheld sex-based correctional officer assignments in women’s prisons”). 
39 OWEN ET AL., supra note 21, at 136. 
40 Cheryl Bell, Martha Coven, John P. Cronan, Christian A. Garza, Janet Guggemos & Laura 
Storto, Rape and Sexual Misconduct in the Prison System: Analyzing America’s Most “Open” Secret, 18 YALE 
L. & POL’Y REV. 195, 203 (1999) (noting that because “[t]he prison guards who oversee these female 
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ostensibly complete control over—populations of incarcerated women, “[c]ross-
gender supervision results in a unique set of institutional concerns regarding 
privacy, sexual harassment, and sexual misconduct.”41 Incarcerated women “are 
dependent on staff for almost everything in the total institution, as they control 
all movement and distribute almost every resource.”42 This total dependency of 
incarcerated women on male guards entrenches a gendered hierarchy whereby 
inmates barter sex for—or engage in sexual relations out of fear of deprivation 
of—basic necessities, such as feminine hygiene products, and simple privileges, 
such as visitation time with family members.43 Indeed, as of 2006, when the   was 
still relatively new law, “it ha[d] become increasingly apparent that women in 
confinement face a substantial risk of sexual assault, most often by a small number 
of ruthless male correctional staff who use terror, retaliation, and repeated 
victimization to coerce and intimidate confined women.”44 
Given the power inequalities between any given female inmate and prison 
staff member, no sexual relationship between them could be consensual. In 
fact, the PREA makes consent unavailable as a defense to sexual relations 
between guards and inmates.45 As Beck argues, 
According to federal law and most state laws, all sexual relations between staff 
and inmates are considered abuse, even if the sexual activity would have been 
considered consensual had it occurred outside of a prison . . . . Staff and 
 
inmates are predominantly male, [this] creat[es] what some consider a highly sexualized and hostile 
environment that invites disaster.”); see also INSIDE THIS PLACE, supra note 24, at 17 (“While abuse in 
male prisons is well documented, women in prison suffer in relative anonymity. This disparity is 
especially troubling, since women in prison are in many cases more vulnerable to rights violations.”). 
41 LEMPERT, supra note 23, at 171. 
42 OWEN ET AL., supra note 21, at 136; see also Saliba, supra note 4, at 296 (“The power dynamic 
of cross-gender supervision is visible in the everyday lives of female prisoners. Male prison guards 
have complete control over the daily activities of the female inmates.”). 
43 See INSIDE THIS PLACE, supra note 24, at 232 (“[W]omen often exchange sex to protect their 
rights to phone calls, visits, or basic supplies such as food, shampoo, and soap.”); see also Buchanan, supra 
note 7, at 57 (noting that “a prisoner who is propositioned by a guard, knowing that the guard will be 
able to rape or beat her if she refuses, might well judge it wise to comply to see what she can reap from 
her association with a guard”). In a story about a female inmate, “Dorothy,” the ACLU reports: “The 
imbalance of power between prisoners and guards leads to the use of both direct physical force and 
indirect force based on the prisoners’ total dependence on guards for basic necessities and the guards’ 
ability to withhold privileges.” ACLU, Words from Prison: Sexual Abuse in Prison, https://www.aclu.org/
other/words-prison-sexual-abuse-prison [https://perma.cc/E4XN-EKUW] (last visited Nov. 2, 2018). 
44 Robert W. Dumond, The Impact of Prisoner Sexual Violence: Challenges of Implementing Public 
Law 108-79 The Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, 32 J. LEGIS. 142, 158 (2006). 
45 See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DETERRING STAFF SEXUAL ABUSE 
OF FEDERAL INMATES 4 (2005), https://oig.justice.gov/special/0504/final.pdf [https://perma.cc/MC8W-77GL ] 
(“It is important to note that consent is never a legal defense for corrections staff who engage in sexual acts 
with inmates. According to federal law, all sexual relations between staff and inmates are considered abuse.”). 
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inmates are in inherently unequal positions, and inmates do not have the 
same ability as staff members to consent to a sexual relationship.46 
In sum, “the social authority and control male custodial officers hold over 
incarcerated women creates a ‘super authority’ and . . . the gaze of male 
guards . . . creates an atmosphere of threat.”47 Consent cannot be 
meaningfully given in this context.48 
The gendered power dynamics at work in women’s prisons are only 
compounded by race. The majority of incarcerated women in the United States 
are women of color.49 In fact, “Black women are the fastest-growing population 
in prisons.”50 Meanwhile, according to the Federal Bureau of Prisons, 62.9% of 
prison staff are white (non-Hispanic).51 Therefore, racial hierarchies exacerbate 
institutional power dynamics from which incarcerated women are already 
suffering. What results is at least three tiers of systemic oppression of 
incarcerated women, who are mostly women of color: (1) the inherent guard-
inmate hierarchy of any prison; (2) a gendered power hierarchy where female 
inmates are subject to supervision by male guards; and (3) these power 
dynamics are further aggravated along racial lines where white men are 
guarding—and preying upon—incarcerated women of color. There are likely 
no two other sociocultural groups so disparate; intersections of race and gender 
within the prison context make these power dynamics particularly problematic 
and self-perpetuating.52 As Buchanan notes: “Women, especially women of 
 
46 Allen J. Beck, Staff Sexual Misconduct: Implications of PREA for Women Working in Corrections, 
16 JUST. RES. & POL’Y 8, 9 (2015). 
47 VanNatta, supra note 11, at 29. 
48 One may take issue with a law that deprives inmates prima facie of autonomy in the form of the ability 
to consent to sexual relations with a prison staff member. For example, “[c]haracterizing their liaisons as 
consensual is empowering to women who have little power otherwise.” LEMPERT, supra note 23, at 171. Further,  
[w]omen prisoners are not a homogenous group of passive victims and can exercise 
agency within these constrained choices of sexual behavior . . . . [I]t may be the case 
that such relationships are truly consensual, or it may be that such relationships can 
be understood as the tactics of the oppressed . . . .  
OWEN ET AL., supra note 21, at 154. Ultimately, however, a female inmate’s “claims of consent [in 
these situations] mask the predatory nature of the sexual liaisons.” LEMPERT, supra note 23, at 172. 
49 See Buchanan, supra note 7, at 48 (“[M]ore than two thirds of women in U.S. prisons are 
African American or Latina.”). 
50 INSIDE THIS PLACE, supra note 24, at 246. 
51 FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, Staff Ethnicity/Race, (2017), https://www.bop.gov/about/
statistics/statistics_staff_ethnicity_race.jsp [https://perma.cc/M2BB-26A5]. 
52 MAXINE BACA ZINN & BONNIE THORNTON DILL, WOMEN OF COLOR IN U.S. SOCIETY 
4, 10 (1993) (describing how “[w]omen of color are subordinated . . . because [of] patterns of 
hierarchy, domination, and oppression based on race, class, gender, and sexual orientation” and that 
“[w]hite males . . . set the standards by which all social action is measured”). 
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color, are exposed to institutionalized sexual abuse, while a network of legal 
rules prevents them from seeking protection or redress in the courts.”53 
B. Reporting Abuse in the Prison Context: Fear and Retaliation 
Beginning from the underlying premise that any prison staff-inmate 
sexual encounter cannot be consensual, reporting sexual abuse is particularly 
dangerous and encumbered by various concerns that a nonincarcerated sexual 
abuse victim may not have to consider. There is a huge disincentive to report 
abuse by a prison staff member “because [inmates] fear staff reprisal, worry 
that others will accuse them of lying, or want to avoid being labeled a 
snitch.”54 Incarcerated women abused by prison staff members “have no exit 
. . . . Unlike women on the outside, who can move, change jobs, or simply 
shop in different neighborhoods, there is no place that imprisoned women 
can go to escape predatory, unprofessional officers.”55 Reporting sexual 
misconduct by prison staff creates myriad dangers and safety risks for 
incarcerated women not only because “the same people being paid to protect 
them” are the ones violating them, but also due to “collateral consequences” 
that can flow from reporting.56 For example, incarcerated women report being 
“placed in disciplinary housing” and “losing [their] privileges” as a result of 
making complaints about sexual misconduct by a prison guard.57 
The threat of retaliation by the officers themselves is perhaps one of the 
greatest deterrents to women inmates reporting sexual abuse. Indeed, 
“[r]etaliation against prisoners who report sexual abuse is all too common and 
can sometimes result in prisoners having to serve longer terms.”58 In one 
account, Teri Hancock, a formerly incarcerated woman, describes prolonged, 
violent sexual abuse by the assistant deputy warden of the facility where she 
 
53 Buchanan, supra note 7, at 55. 
54 Laderberg, supra note 22, at 324; see also Rachel Culley, “The Judge Didn’t Sentence Me to be 
Raped”: Tracy Neal v. Michigan Department of Corrections: A 15-Year Battle Against the Sexual Abuse 
of Women Inmates in Michigan, 22 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 206, 211 (2012) (“Several factors 
discouraged women from speaking up, including fear of punishment or confrontation.”). 
55 LEMPERT, supra note 23, at 174; see also Buchanan, supra note 7, at 65 (“Outside prison, 
women who are raped often find that the experience of reporting their assault . . . is so humiliating 
that it is akin to a second rape. Inside prison, women who use the grievance system to report guards’ 
sexual abuse have been subjected to real second rapes in retaliation.” (citation omitted)). 
56 OWEN ET AL. supra note 21, at 164. 
57 Id. 
58 Bell et al., supra note 40, at 210; see also INSIDE THIS PLACE, supra note 24, at 65 (describing 
“the first time [a guard] raped [her]” and that “[e]veryone knew that you couldn’t go to the prison 
officials and give a report, because the prison officials wouldn’t do anything other than retaliate 
against you. That officer sexually assaulted me for years.”); Saliba, supra note 4, at 299 (“[T]he guard 
will most likely assault the woman who complained. Some inmates have reported that the guards 
work as a team, one will keep [watch] while the other sexual [sic] assaults the woman inside.”). 
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served her sentence.59 When Teri told a friend about the assaults via mail, the 
facility intercepted the letter and sent it to internal affairs, and the prison 
warden and his colleagues repeatedly threatened Teri.60 Another formerly 
imprisoned woman, Emily Madison, tells a similar story. After reporting a 
guard who had sexually assaulted her and raped other inmates, Emily 
describes: “The retaliation was horrible. The officers made me submit urine 
samples on a weekly basis. They would wake me up on the midnight shift 
. . . . They would come and shake my room down.”61 
Central to many claims of sexual assault is a credibility problem.62 Here, 
“[a]ccusers—typically women—do not tend to fare well in these [he said/she 
said] contests.”63 Credibility problems are particularly acute in the male-
guard-on-female-inmate sexual assault context because most—if not all—
cases will be “word on word,” and the power differentials inherent to the 
prison system make one party (the guard) assumedly more trustworthy than 
the complainant-inmate.64 Furthermore, in this context, there is little or no 
“corroborative evidence” that there might be in a sexual assault that occurs 
outside prison walls.65 Even where there may be a corroborating witness to a 
prison sexual assault by a guard, that witness is unlikely to come forward: 
where the witness is another inmate, she could also “face potential retaliation 
for cooperating,”66 and where the witness is another guard, he is either 
complicit in the abuse or unwilling to report a coworker.67 
Tuerkheimer describes credibility as comprising two parts: trustworthiness 
and plausibility.68 “A listener engages in credibility discounting when, based 
upon a faulty preconception, he reduces a speaker’s perceived trustworthiness 
or diminishes the plausibility of her account.”69 Credibility “discounting,” as 
 
59 INSIDE THIS PLACE, supra note 24, at 96-98. 
60 Id. at 98. 
61 Id. at 113. 
62 Deborah Tuerkheimer, Incredible Women: Sexual Violence and the Credibility Discount, 166 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2017). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 9. 
65 See id. at 9-10 (describing various types of “[c]orroborative evidence . . . [that] can include electronic 
evidence like text messages, voicemails, photographs or social media posts, forensic reports, witnesses to the 
lead-up or aftermath, and, on rare occasions, eyewitnesses to the incident.”) (citation omitted). Arguably, 
none of these types of corroboration exist with any regularity in the prison sexual assault context. 
66 McGuire, supra note 4, at 12; see also INSIDE THIS PLACE, supra note 24, at 65 (in one 
inmate’s account of sexual assault, her cellmate knew of the abuse but “she didn’t do or say anything 
at the time because she didn’t want to get involved.”). 
67 See Frank, supra note 13, at 4-5 (“Guards not only assaulted the women, but served as ‘look-
outs’ during assaults by other staff.”); see also VICTORIA LAW, RESISTANCE BEHIND BARS: THE 
STRUGGLES OF INCARCERATED WOMEN 63-67 (2009) (describing female prisoners suffering from 
retaliation by their abusers’ fellow guards after reporting sexual assaults). 
68 Tuerkheimer, supra note 62, at 13-14. 
69 Id. at 14. 
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Tuerkheimer terms it, is a zero-sum game: “[U]nder certain circumstances—
notably the word-on-word case—a determination that one party is worthy of 
belief requires a judgment that the other is not.”70 In the custodial sexual assault 
context, this will almost always operate to the detriment of the inmate-victim 
whose account is weighed against that of a guard.71 
Thus, not only do incarcerated women have well-founded fears of further 
abuse and retaliation for reporting, these women have reason to doubt how 
their own stories will be perceived. Grounded in baseless stereotypes, 
incarcerated women in particular suffer from a severe lack of credibility when 
reporting sexual misconduct by prison guards: “Inmates have reported that 
prison authorities don’t take the reports of sexual abuse seriously. In fact, 
when they do report the abuse, many are ridiculed and may even be 
prescribed medication to help with their ‘hallucinations’ as they are often 
labeled delusional.”72 In one study, prosecutors consistently described juries’ 
refusals to believe inmates’ accounts of abuse.73 
Prison grievance procedures further reflect this inherent distrust of 
inmates’ complaints. Near-impossible hurdles in the form of substantiation and 
corroboration requirements—as determined and enforced by the state—force a 
prisoner filing a complaint for sexual abuse to provide, for example, “physical 
proof or DNA evidence.”74 These procedural requirements “stem[] from prison 
authorities’ and courts’ blanket reluctance to accept a prisoner’s word over a 
guard’s . . . . [P]risoners face an overt ‘presumption of incredibility’ . . . .”75 
Indeed, in a seminal multijurisdictional report on women’s prisons, Human 
Rights Watch concluded: “No state we visited adequately ensures that female 
prisoners can speedily and effectively complain of such abuse with confidence 
that it will be impartially investigated and remedied and without fear that they 
will face retaliation or even punishment.”76 
As a result, current figures on sexual assaults in prison grossly 
underestimate the true extent of the problem. Power dynamics disincentivize 
reporting, and when incarcerated victims do report their abuse, they suffer 
 
70 Id. at 15. 
71 Brown, supra note 14 (“Prosecutors say that without hard evidence, such as DNA or damning 
video footage, proving officer misconduct can be impossible.”). 
72 Saliba, supra note 4, at 299 (citation omitted). 
73 Brenda V. Smith & Jaime M. Yarussi, Prosecuting Sexual Violence in Correctional Settings: Examining 
Prosecutors’ Perceptions, 3 AM. U. CRIM. L. BR. 19, 21 (2008) (“Both state and federal prosecutors noted that 
while it was easier for juries to understand the abuse of power issue, juries have problems accepting the 
credibility of inmates. Juries perceived inmates as liars with a bias against corrections staff.”). 
74 Buchanan, supra note 7, at 65; see also supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the 
vigorous scrutiny to which prisoner sexual assault complaints are held). 
75 Buchanan, supra note 7, at 65-66. 
76 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, All Too Familiar: Sexual Abuse of Women in U.S. State Prisons 
(1996), https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1996/Us1.htm#_1_19 [https://perma.cc/4XHX-4W5N]. 
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harsh, retaliatory consequences. The result is a system that deters reporting 
and facilitates unmitigated sexual abuse of incarcerated women.77 
II. PROCEDURAL BARRIERS AND ACCESS TO COURTS 
When incarcerated women do report sexual abuse by guards, they face 
extreme procedural hurdles. First, before they can get to court, inmate 
complainants must satisfy the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA.78 The 
PLRA makes the exhaustion of administrative remedies mandatory.79 Under the 
PLRA as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Woodford v. Ngo, any incarcerated 
person seeking access to the federal courts must “properly exhaust[]” all available 
administrative remedies—namely, prison grievance procedures.80 The PLRA, 
discussed below, has posed “significant procedural barriers to litigation. Women 
in prison are . . . forced to rely on what are often inadequate internal prison-
grievance systems.”81 Each of these hurdles will be addressed in turn. 
A. Prison Grievance Procedures 
First, any prisoner seeking to file a civil claim in federal court must 
initially lodge a complaint through the grievance process at the facility where 
she is incarcerated.82 Generally, this entails a multistep complaint process.83 
As Borchardt details, 
First, a prisoner must seek to remedy the complaint through “informal 
resolution,” as it is usually called. Although ostensibly “informal,” this first stage 
frequently requires a degree of formality, as the grievance may be dismissed for 
minor procedural defects: using the wrong form, using the wrong color ink, 
attaching additional pages to the requisite form, or describing the complaint with 
insufficient specificity. Second, if the informal resolution attempt does not result 
in a favorable outcome, the prisoner must file a “formal grievance,” as it is usually 
called. Formal grievances require multiple procedural technicalities—such as 
 
77 Anthony C. Thompson, What Happens Behind Locked Doors: The Difficulty of Addressing and 
Eliminating Rape in Prison, 35 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 119, 125 (2009) (“Despite 
underreporting, the numbers of reported prison rapes reveal a terrifying reality.”). 
78 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012). 
79 Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006). 
80 Id. at 92. 
81 INSIDE THIS PLACE, supra note 24, at 227. 
82 Cindy Chen, Note, The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Doing Away with More Than Just 
Crunchy Peanut Butter, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 203, 217 (2004) (“The exhaustion of administrative 
remedies entails that a prisoner litigant must first process his claims through all of the institutional 
grievance procedures before bringing a suit in federal court.”). 
83 Derek Borchardt, Note, The Iron Curtain Redrawn Between Prisoners and the Constitution, 43 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 469, 492 (2012). 
 
746 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 733 
using the correct form, attaching the right documentation, naming individuals 
and places involved with sufficient specificity, using the right color ink, and 
others—for which failure to comply may result in dismissal. Third, if the formal 
grievance does not result in a favorable outcome, the prisoner must file an 
appeal. Some grievance systems require a second level of appeal, which is the 
fourth and usually final stage of the grievance process.84 
Prison grievance processes are highly variable because states and 
independent bodies within states, including municipalities and even 
individual prisons, are responsible for creating and maintaining their own 
grievance procedures.85 These procedures sometimes involve ludicrous 
deadlines, which, if a prisoner fails to meet, will render her complaint 
untimely and will preclude successful progression to the federal court system 
because she failed to exhaust her “available” administrative remedies.86 Even 
the Supreme Court has recognized that “the deadline for filing an 
administrative grievance is generally not very long—14 to 30 days.”87 Indeed, 
these procedures “invite[] technical mistakes resulting in inadvertent 
noncompliance with the exhaustion requirement, and barring litigants from 
court because of their ignorance and uncounselled procedural errors.”88 
The prison grievance system is riddled not only with procedural trapdoors 
that make deadline and rule-compliant filing extremely difficult, but also with 
significant risks to those who do attempt to make use of the system.89 First, 
the nature of the system requires a “prisoner to report the abuse to her 
abuser’s colleagues through an often-humiliating disciplinary procedure that 
is likely to result in retaliation.”90 In addition, these processes are not 
 
84 Id. at 492-94 (footnotes omitted). 
85 Id. at 490. 
86 Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006); see also Buchanan, supra note 7, at 72 (giving the example 
of the New York Department of Corrections, which “imposes a fourteen-day limit for filing any prisoner 
grievance, unless the grievance authority determines that ‘mitigating circumstances’ justify the delay.”). 
87 Woodford, 548 U.S. at 95. 
88 John Boston, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: The New Face of Court Stripping, 67 BROOK. L. 
REV. 429, 431 (2001); see also Borchardt, supra note 83, at 494 (“Grievance systems generally have 
very strict time requirements—usually mere days—that prisoners must satisfy when proceeding 
through each stage of the grievance process. Prisoners are deemed to have exhausted the grievance 
procedures only when they have successfully completed all stages, satisfying the requisite time limits 
and procedural technicalities.” (footnote omitted)). 
89 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 76 (“Grievance or investigatory procedures, where they 
exist, are often ineffectual, and correctional employees continue to engage in abuse because they believe 
they will rarely be held accountable, administratively or criminally. Few people outside the prison walls 
know what is going on or care if they do know. Fewer still do anything to address the problem.”). 
90 Buchanan, supra note 7, at 73 (footnote omitted). 
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confidential, exposing the victim to further abuse.91 As a result, prisoners do 
not make use of the prison grievance system. Lori Girshick concludes, 
The grievance process can be difficult for inmates to access. It is a risky step more 
likely to lead to harassment and retaliation than redress for a wrong done . . . . 
Officers always know when a grievance has been filed and the inmate will still be at 
the mercy of that officer for further sexual abuse or hassles in daily living. This serves 
as a serious disincentive for coming forward and making reports. Inmates report that 
sometimes the grievance is thrown into the trash right in front of them.92 
B. The Prison Litigation Reform Act 
The PLRA was passed with the aim of curbing “frivolous” prisoner 
litigation.93 As Margo Schlanger, who has extensively studied and written on 
the PLRA and inmate litigation, notes, 
The government officials and legislators who were the driving force behind 
the PLRA presented the following account of the cases: inmates, they said, 
were unduly litigious, making federal cases out of the most trivial mishaps; 
the cases were deluging both executive and judicial officials who were 
supposed to respond to them . . . .94 
The most significant section of the PLRA is its exhaustion requirement, codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This exhaustion provision mandates: “No action shall be 
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any 
other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional 
facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”95 
The Supreme Court further elaborated on the exhaustion provision in two 
cases, decided within months of each other: Woodford v. Ngo96 and Jones v. 
Bock.97 In Woodford, the Court held that administrative grievance procedures 
must be “properly” exhausted, which in the prison context means meeting all 
 
91 Brocco, supra note 15, at 926-27; see also Buchanan, supra note 7, at 64 (“Prison staff often fail 
to keep prisoner grievances confidential: thus when a prisoner attempts to file a grievance, she often 
faces retaliatory harassment, discipline, or even assault by guards.”). 
92 Lori B. Girshick, Abused Women and Incarceration, in WOMEN IN PRISON: GENDER AND 
SOCIAL CONTROL 95, 109 (Barbara H. Zaitzow & Jim Thomas, eds., 2003). 
93 Chen, supra note 82, at 221; see also Brocco, supra note 15, at 925 (“To reduce frivolous lawsuits, 
PLRA imposes restrictions on prisoner litigation. The number of complaints filed before and after PLRA’s 
passage shows that these restrictions successfully reduced prisoner complaints.”). 
94 Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1567 (2003). 
95 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012). 
96 548 U.S. 81 (2006). 
97 549 U.S. 199 (2007). 
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deadlines as required by the correctional institution’s grievance system.98 
There, respondent-prisoner Ngo argued that administrative remedies were 
no longer “available” to him at the correctional facility where he was 
incarcerated because time to file had run.99 The Court rejected Ngo’s 
argument that “the reason why administrative remedies are no longer 
available is irrelevant. Bare unavailability suffices even if this results from a 
prisoner’s deliberate strategy of refraining from filing a timely grievance.”100 
In turn, the Court held that such an interpretation of the PLRA would nullify 
the exhaustion requirement.101 Ngo failed to exhaust administrative remedies 
properly on account of lack of compliance with timely grievance filing that 
then precluded bringing a civil claim in federal court.102 
A few months later, in Jones v. Bock, the Court reiterated the proper 
exhaustion requirement of the PLRA.103 The Jones Court held, however, that 
exhaustion is not a pleading requirement to be fulfilled by prisoners; failure to 
exhaust is an affirmative defense.104 Furthermore, the Court went on to hold that 
where a prisoner states multiple claims but fails to exhaust only some, failure to 
exhaust part does not defeat an otherwise procedurally compliant whole.105 
The exhaustion requirement has worked a significant disadvantage to 
prisoner suits. “Claims have been barred despite the fact that special 
circumstances—such as illiteracy, physical illness, and mental illness—would have 
made compliance with standard grievance procedures impossible.”106 Even 
though the exhaustion requirement may be the most daunting PLRA-imposed 
hurdle to prisoner litigation,107 it is by no means the only impediment to 
prisoners filing civil complaints in federal courts. The PLRA also requires even 
indigent prisoners filing pro se to pay filing fees.108 This further distinguishes 
 
98 Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-91 (“Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s 
deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively 
without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.”). 
99 Id. at 87-88. 
100 Id. at 88. 
101 Id. at 95. 
102 Id. at 87. 
103 Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). 
104 See id. at 216 (“We conclude that failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA, 
and that inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.”). 
105 See id. at 222 (“A typical PLRA suit with multiple claims, on the other hand, may combine 
a wide variety of discrete complaints, about interactions with guards, prison conditions, generally 
applicable rules, and so on, seeking different relief on each claim. There is no reason failure to 
exhaust on one necessarily affects any other.”). 
106 INSIDE THIS PLACE, supra note 24, at 229; see also id. (“In one particularly notorious case, 
it took a court almost five years to determine that a group of women filing a class action suit alleging 
sexual assault had not properly exhausted their administrative remedies.” (citation omitted)). 
107 See Buchanan, supra note 7, at 72 (“The most damaging hurdle imposed by the PLRA is its 
grievance-exhaustion requirement.”). 
108 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (2012). 
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prisoner-filed suits from other civil suits filed pro se: “In non-prisoner litigation 
lawsuits, indigent persons who cannot afford their court costs may file in forma 
pauperis, and disregard the costs. This indigent-friendly costs exception is not 
available to a prisoner-plaintiff. The only available option is to pay the fees in 
installments over time.”109 In addition, the PLRA imposes a three-strikes rule: 
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil 
action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior 
occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or 
appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it 
is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, 
unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.110 
Another troubling limitation imposed by the PLRA is the physical injury 
requirement. This clause mandates that a prisoner make “a prior showing of 
physical injury or the commission of a sexual act.”111 The PLRA does not 
answer whether custodial sexual assault is itself a physical injury or something 
more (e.g. bruising, bleeding, broken bones) is required.112 Courts have 
described physical injuries meeting this requirement as those that are 
“observable or diagnosable medical condition[s] requiring treatment by a 
medical care professional.”113 It is particularly challenging for female inmates 
to meet the physical injury requirement because “the courts find the rape of 
a woman to be somehow less of an injury than the rape of a man.”114 Given 
the frequent lack of corroborating or physical evidence to support a finding 
of injury or past sexual act in custodial sexual abuse cases,115 “although the 
case law is far from uniform, some courts have deemed sexual assault not to 
constitute a ‘physical injury’ within the meaning of the PLRA.”116 Making a 
 
109 Brocco, supra note 15, at 927 (citations to the PLRA omitted). 
110 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2012). 
111 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(e) (West 2013) (“No Federal civil action may be brought by a 
prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered 
while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act.”). 
112 Deborah M. Golden, It’s Not All In My Head: The Harm of Rape and the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 37, 45 (2004). 
113 Id. at 47; see also Luong v. Hatt, 979 F. Supp. 481, 486 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (supplying this 
definition of “physical injury”); Mala v. Pastrana, No. 08-22629, 2009 WL 3055214, at *2 (S.D. Fla. 
July 6, 2009) (citing Luong for the same definition). 
114 Golden, supra note 112, at 51. 
115 See, e.g., Dumond, supra note 44, at 158-59 (2006) (describing the case of Hope Hernandez, 
who was raped by a prison guard: “‘Later I told a nurse what had happened, and they took me to 
the hospital to do a rape kit. But the officer had used a condom. The rape kit came back . . . 
inconclusive.’” (citations omitted)). 
116 Margo Schlanger & Giovanna Shay, Preserving the Rule of Law in America’s Jails and Prisons: 
The Case for Amending the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 139, 144 (2008); see also 
Hancock v. Payne, No. Civ.A.103CV671JMRJMR, 2006 WL 21751, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 4, 2006) 
(finding the physical injury requirement unsatisfied where “the plaintiffs do not make any claim of 
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showing of physical injury first requires reporting the assault, which, as noted 
above, inmates are unlikely to do for myriad, compound reasons.117 Further, 
this showing demands a collection of evidence by prison authorities—such as 
DNA evidence or photographs of marks or bruising—that either may not 
result from a particular assault or that the prison may be unable or unwilling 
to gather.118 Several authors note that the physical injury requirement 
“effectively curtails actions for damages brought by prisoners seeking redress 
from rape.”119 This may have been an unintended consequence of the PLRA, 
but it is an effect with which prisoners must now contend.120 
 As a result of these provisions aimed at deterring prisoner suits—and, at 
the very least, making them procedurally difficult to bring—prisoner civil 
filings were down in the years immediately following passage of the PLRA.121 
In 1995, there were 24.6 prisoner civil filings per 1000 prisoners; by 1997, the 
year after the PLRA became law, that figure was down to 15.1, and continued 
to decrease through 2007, at which point there were only 9.6 civil prisoner-
filed claims per 1000 prisoners.122 While the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of the exhaustion requirement in Woodford may not have had a similar effect,123 
at least in the context of prisoners filing claims of sexual assault and abuse, the 
PLRA appears to have operated as intended by curbing not only frivolous 
claims, but also potentially meritorious ones. The procedural strictures of the 
PLRA, however, leave the relative merits of many such prisoner-filed suits 
unknown. The PLRA, in conjunction with prison-specific power dynamics 
that engender fear of retaliation at every turn, have effectively operated to 
disincentivize and limit prisoner–victims from utilizing grievance procedures 
and proceeding with legal redress against guards who assault them.124 
 
physical injury beyond the bare allegation of sexual assault.”); Margo Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner 
Litigation, as the PLRA Enters Adulthood, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 153, 162 (2015) (“In particular, 
prisoners’ cases are thrown out of court for failure to properly complete often-complicated grievance 
procedures, or because they do not allege physical injury, which some courts read the PLRA to 
require for recovery even in constitutional cases.” (citation omitted)). 
117 See supra Part I. 
118 David K. Ries, Note, Duty-to-Protect Claims by Inmates After the Prison Rape Elimination Act, 
13 J.L. & POL’Y 915, 938 (2005). 
119 Golden, supra note 112, at 38; see also Buchanan, supra note 7, at 73 (“On its face, however, the 
physical injury requirement appears to bar prisoner claims for sexual abuse if no physical injury results.”). 
120 See Golden, supra note 112, at 44-45 (“Even those lawmakers who opposed the enactment 
of the PLRA did not raise the issue of rape cases.”). 
121 See Schlanger, supra note 116, at 155-56 (2015) (“In 1996, the PLRA immediately transformed the 
litigation landscape. After a very steep decline in both filings and filing rates in 1996 and 1997, rates continued 
to shrink for another decade. Since 2007, filing rates, prison population, and filings have all plateaued.”). 
122 Id. at 157. 
123 Elana M. Stern, Comment, Completely Exhausted: Evaluating the Impact of Woodford v. Ngo 
on Prisoner Litigation in Federal Courts, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1511, 1512-13 (2018). 
124 Golden, supra note 112, at 60. 
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C. Pleading Requirements 
A final point to consider here is that when prisoners do file a claim, most 
do so pro se.125 Unlike in “criminal and administrative [proceedings that] are 
largely ‘out of the victim’s hands’ in that prosecutors or prison administrators 
must initiate and pursue the cases against the assailants,”126 here a prisoner-
claimant remains the master of her own case, but she does so at her peril. 
Under federal pleading requirements, an inmate must state her claim with 
sufficient facts to meet a standard of plausibility.127 This heightened pleading 
standard is especially arduous for inmates, who represent themselves and are 
without access to resources for or assistance with conducting formalities of 
litigation, such as legal research and fact discovery.128 As a result, meeting the 
pleading requirements is yet another procedural hurdle that makes sustaining 
prisoners’ pro se civil claims nearly impossible.129 
III. EXISTING REMEDIES AND LITIGATION 
While male-guard-on-female-inmate sexual abuse is rarely the subject of civil 
litigation or criminal prosecution,130 not all prisoner-brought litigation is 
fruitless.131 The Supreme Court has recognized that “rape or other violence . . . 
serves absolutely no penological purpose.”132 In Farmer v. Brennan, the Court held 
that prison officials’ displays of “deliberate indifference” toward “a substantial 
risk of serious harm to an inmate” constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.133 
Farmer concerned a transgender inmate’s complaints that guards displayed 
deliberate indifference to her safety by placing her in the general prison 
population at a male correctional facility despite her appearance that “project[ed] 
 
125 Brocco, supra note 15, at 928-29; see also Hon. Jon O. Newman, Pro Se Prisoner Litigation: 
Looking for Needles in Haystacks, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 519, 519 (1996) (“Prisoner lawsuits challenging 
prison conditions share two characteristics. Nearly all of these lawsuits are filed pro se, and the vast 
majority are dismissed as frivolous.”). 
126 McGuire, supra note 4. 
127 See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544 (2007). 
128 Brocco, supra note 15, at 929; see also id. at 930-36 (detailing the pleading requirements for 
federal complaints); Chen, supra note 82, at 215 (“A great deal of prisoners do not have adequate 
schooling, have learning disabilities, and are ‘functionally illiterate.’ It is not easy for a prisoner to 
simply draft up a complaint that would communicate the extent of his injuries so that they represent 
a cognizable legal claim.” (internal citation omitted)). 
129 Brocco, supra note 15, at 930-36. 
130 INSIDE THIS PLACE, supra note 24, at 227. 
131 For a comprehensive sampling of federal civil suits by circuit, see generally Brenda V. Smith 
& Melissa C. Loomis, Sexual Abuse in Custody: A Case Law Study, NATIONAL PREA RESOURCE 
CENTER (Feb. 1, 2013), https://www.prearesourcecenter.org/sites/default/files/library/sexualabuse
casescaselawsurvey.pdf [https://perma.cc/WNC7-WUSV]. 
132 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 852 (1994) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
133 Id. at 828 (majority opinion). 
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feminine characteristics.”134 The Farmer Court defined “deliberate indifference” 
on the part of a prison guard as a subjective standard, where “the official knows 
of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must 
both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial 
risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”135 Female 
inmates have been able to bring cognizable and successful federal and state civil 
claims to seek redress for sexual harm suffered while incarcerated. Most of these 
cases are brought in federal court,136 most commonly under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.137 
Section 1983 claims, however, also create multiple challenges for prisoner-
litigants, which will be discussed in the latter part of this section. 
A. Some Success Stories 
Where female inmates have successfully brought federal civil actions, they 
have generally done so as a class.138 For example, in Women Prisoners v. District of 
Columbia,139 a class of female inmates succeeded at the district court level.140 In 
addition to detailing “countless incidents of sexual misconduct between prison 
employees and female prisoners[,]”141 the plaintiff class also mounted an 
extensive, expert-laden case, “address[ing] the flaws in the Inmate Grievance 
Procedure, the lack of specific staff training, the absence of confidentiality of 
complaints, the inadequacy of the investigations, and the prison’s repeated 
failures to take remedial action.”142 In the aftermath of Women Prisoners, the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld a jury verdict finding deliberate 
indifference where a single inmate alleged that she was forced to perform a 
striptease for prison guards.143 In a Massachusetts federal case, Kane v. Winn, the 
court noted: “In other litigation, the federal government has . . . reached 
substantial settlements with the states of Arizona and Michigan 
 
134 Id. at 830-31 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
135 Id. at 837. 
136 Bell et al., supra note 40, at 214. 
137 Ashley E. Day, Cruel and Unusual Punishment of Female Inmates: The Need for Redress Under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 555, 557 (1998) (“The main legal channel for female 
prisoners who file a cause of action alleging abuse by male prison guards is under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
which addresses violations of constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment.”). 
138 See Laderberg, supra note 22, at 326 (“[C]lass action suits under the Eighth Amendment 
have emerged as the best option for prisoners wishing to obtain injunctive relief from custodial 
abuse in American prisons.”); see also id. at 341 (“The prison administration often has ignored or 
dismissed individual incidents of sexual abuse . . . .”). 
139 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994), vacated in part, modified in part, 899 F. Supp. 659 (D.D.C. 
1995), remanded by 95 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
140 Bell, et al., supra note 40, at 217. 
141 Id. at 216. 
142 Laderberg, supra note 22, at 354. 
143 Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 441 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
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regarding sexual misconduct and privacy violations that female inmates have 
suffered at the hands of prison guards.”144 More recently, in a § 1983 class action 
suit in the Southern District of New York, currently-incarcerated women alleged 
multiple incidents of abuse by prison guards, including retaliation for reporting 
abuse.145 Plaintiffs in this suit sought redress under the Eighth Amendment.146 
On the state level, Tracy Neal v. Michigan Department of Corrections serves 
as another example of successful prisoner class action litigation to address 
sexual abuse.147 In Neal, “[t]he allegations involved sexual abuse spanning 
more than two decades and several administrations.”148 Despite a protracted 
history, the case resulted in a jury verdict for the plaintiffs, who were inmates, 
along with a monetary damages award of over $15 million.149 
B. No Guarantees: Stumbling Blocks and Cases Lost 
Filing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 remains a challenge for prisoners—
especially those filing pro se—and formerly incarcerated individuals trying to 
state a claim about what occurred during their confinement. In order to sustain 
a § 1983 claim for Eighth Amendment violations, a complaint must “allege a 
deprivation of a civil right.”150 Furthermore, “the plaintiff must prove that the 
party acted under color of law.”151 It is difficult for abused inmates to meet the 
requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the person acting “under color of 
state law”152 must do so with “‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or 
 
144 319 F. Supp. 2d 162, 187 (D. Mass. 2004). 
145 Complaint at 5-45, Jane Jones et al. v. Annucci, https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.
php?id=15190 [https://perma.cc/UU5P-KWE5]. 
146 Id. at 2. The suit was voluntarily dismissed by the parties in December 2016. Civil Rights 
Litigation Clearinghouse, Case Profile: Jane Jones v. Annucci, https://www.clearinghouse.net/
detail.php?id=15190 [https://perma.cc/7HQA-FCFQ] (last visited Oct. 26, 2018). 
147 Culley, supra note 54, at 207. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Day, supra note 137, at 557. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. The statute mandates that 
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress. 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). 
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safety.”153 Making a sufficient showing of subjective deliberate indifference 
under Farmer is a burden that many prisoners filing pro se cannot meet.154 
Furthermore, as government authorities, prison personnel enjoy qualified 
immunity.155 The Supreme Court has held that “an official is entitled to 
immunity unless his conduct violates a ‘clearly established’ constitutional 
right.”156 Additionally, “institutional liability is available only if the prisoner 
can prove that the guard’s unconstitutional conduct resulted from a 
governmental custom, policy, rule, or practice.”157 In some instances, courts 
have held that “[w]here guards themselves are responsible for the rape and 
sexual abuse of inmates, qualified immunity offers no shield.”158 But courts do 
not so uniformly hold.159 Indeed, “as interpreted by the circuit courts, Farmer 
has significantly limited the circumstances in which judges can hold prison 
officials accountable.”160 Thus, it is almost impossible for an inmate filing a 
Section 1983 action pro se to do so successfully.161 
In addition to pleading and immunity problems, prisoners are up against 
statutes of limitations. Section 1983 does not have an independent statute of 
limitations, but rather, federal courts apply the relevant state statute of limitations, 
which ranges from one to three years.162 Not only may prisoners be unaware of 
the statutes of limitations applicable to their claims, but an otherwise meritorious 
claim “may be precluded altogether if the statute of limitations for the Section 
1983 claim expires before the prisoner has exhausted all administrative 
 
153 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 825 (1994); see also Buchanan, supra note 7, at 85 (“Any 
abuse or oppression of prisoners, no matter how cruel or unusual, is constitutionally permitted unless 
the prisoner can prove that the prison official engaged in deliberate ‘unnecessary and wanton 
infliction of pain . . .’”). 
154 Buchanan, supra note 7, at 85 (“A purely objective showing of deliberate indifference—
negligence or gross negligence—is not enough.”). 
155 Buchanan, supra note 7, at 75. 
156 Stephanie E. Balcerzak, Note, Qualified Immunity for Government Officials: The Problem of 
Unconstitutional Purpose in Civil Rights Litigation, 95 YALE L.J. 126 (1985) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 
157 Buchanan, supra note 7, at 75. 
158 Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original) (citing 
Mathie v. Fries, 935 F. Supp. 1284, 1301 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding defendant liable under section 1983 
where “[t]he sexual abuse and sodomy perpetrated . . . against the powerless inmate was applied 
maliciously and sadistically in order to afford personal gratification to [defendant]. These malicious 
acts violated all contemporary standards of decency.”)); see also Ware v. Jackson Cty., 150 F.3d 873, 
876-87 (8th Cir. 1998) (upholding finding of section 1983 liability where inmate successfully alleged 
“rampant sexual misconduct of employees at the [correctional facility] toward female inmates.”). 
159 See Bell, et al., supra note 40, at 213 (“In Carrigan v. Delaware, even when an official was 
aware of incidents of sexual harassment within his prison, that awareness was not sufficient to 
constitute ‘deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.’”). 
160 Id. 
161 Buchanan, supra note 7, at 75. 
162 Chen, supra note 82, at 224-25. 
 
2019] Accessing Accountability 755 
remedies.”163 As a result, statutes of limitations further compound exhaustion 
requirements to keep inmates’ claims out of court on procedural grounds.164 
More often than not, inmates’ complaints of sexual abuse result in little 
or no action by the prison, and guards suffer few, if any, consequences. Guards 
against whom grievances are lodged will sometimes get transferred to other 
facilities or lose their jobs as “punishment.”165 Indeed, “correctional staff are 
allowed to resign, an administrative sanction, in lieu of being criminally 
prosecuted for sexual abuse with persons in custody.”166 Even where legal 
action ensues, accused guards have not necessarily even faced those 
repercussions: in an Ohio case settled during the course of litigation, the 
accused guard “was fired and then reinstated with the stipulation that he 
not work with female inmates, according to court documents.”167 The lack 
of severe sanctions—criminal or otherwise—for guards who sexually 
assault inmates is not merely anecdotal: in a report based on data from 
2009-2011, BJS concluded that “[t]he most commonly imposed sanctions 
for staff sexual misconduct were loss of job (in 85% of incidents) . . . .”168 
A case example illustrates the shortcomings and challenges of inmate 
civil litigation. In a Section 1983 case brought in the Southern District of 
New York and appealed to the Second Circuit, the courts found that a 
group of currently and formerly incarcerated women could not proceed 
with their claims of sexual abuse and harassment by prison officials at 
several correctional facilities for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, 
and further concluded that no “special circumstances” existed to “excuse 
 
163 Antonieta Pimienta, Note, Overcoming Administrative Silence in Prisoner Litigation: Grievance 
Specificity and the “Object Intelligibly” Standard, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1209, 1219 (2014). 
164 See supra Part II. 
165 See Brown, supra note 14 (“The so-called punishment for an officer who rapes an inmate is 
to get transferred to another facility.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
166 Smith & Yarussi, supra note 73, at 21. 
167 Eric Heisig, Ohio Will Pay $525,000 to Cleveland Woman Who Accused Prison Guard of Sexual 
Assault, CLEVELAND.COM (Oct. 25, 2017), http://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/index.ssf/2017/10/
ohio_will_pay_525000_to_clevel.html [https://perma.cc/6G62-W3M8]; see also John Rudolf, Alabama 
Women’s Prison Inmates Sexually Abused by Guards, Report Says, HUFFINGTON POST (May 5, 2012, 
7:27 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/22/alabama-womens-prison-sexual-abuse_n_
1537623.html [https://perma.cc/MP4V-ECXL] (reporting on an Alabama women’s prison where 
sexual abuse is rampant: “All of the charges [against prison guards] were settled with plea bargains, 
and only one prison employee served more than six days in jail.”). 
168  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 5, at 2; see also Simon McCormack, Prison Staff 
Not Held Accountable for Sexual Abuse of Inmates: Report, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 24, 2014, 4:54 PM, 
updated Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/24/prison-staff-sex-abuse-report_
n_4661485.html [https://perma.cc/FXU6-DRJH] (referencing the 2014 BJS report: “The report also said 
that just 27 percent of staff who were referred for prosecution were arrested, and only 1 percent were 
convicted.”); Goldstein, supra note 14 (“New York City agreed to pay $1.2 million to settle a lawsuit 
brought by two female inmates who accused a guard at Rikers Island of repeatedly sexually abusing them. 
That guard was never criminally charged and remains employed by the city Correction Department.”). 
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. . . failure to exhaust.”169 The district court held administrative exhaustion 
procedurally defective here despite the plaintiffs’ allegation “that 
administrative remedies were rendered ‘unavailable’ by virtue of threats made 
against them.”170 The district court reasoned that because a few of the 
plaintiffs did file some form of grievance, this “directly cuts against [their] 
argument that the process is unavailable to victims of sexual abuse” and 
further that the “evidence does not demonstrate that Plaintiffs’ efforts at 
grieving properly were thwarted, but rather shows that they merely selected 
to pursue informal avenues instead of the formal grievance procedure.”171 
Such cases demonstrate the inherent flaws in the PLRA and prison 
grievance procedures,172 and further illustrate the ultimate conclusion that 
current forms of legal redress for custodial sexual assault are, at best, 
inadequate.173 Given the shortcomings of civil claims and their obvious failure 
to mitigate staff sexual abuse of inmates, the following section will explore 
the possibility and utility of criminal liability. 
IV. CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
Criminal prosecutions may be the preferable mode of redress for custodial 
sexual assault, rather than civil litigation grounded in federal law that is 
relatively difficult to bring successfully given the myriad hurdles just 
described.174 Indeed, “the majority of people in the U.S. prison population 
fall under the jurisdiction of the states, . . . [thus] state criminal laws are 
arguably the most important mechanisms for addressing sexual misconduct 
in prisons.”175 Criminal cases have rarely been brought against prison staff for 
sexual abuse of female inmates;176 a few recent cases have involved criminal 
 
169 Amador v. Andrews, 655 F.3d 89, 102-03 (2d Cir. 2011). 
170 Amador v. Superintendents Dep’t. Corr. Servs., No. 03 Civ. 0650 (KTD)(GWG), 2007 WL 4326747, 
at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2007), vacated in part, dismissed in part by Amadaor v. Andrews, 655 F. 3d 89 (2d Cir. 2011). 
171 Id. 
172 See supra notes 93–124 and accompanying text (discussing the PLRA and barriers to 
prisoner-initiated civil litigation in federal courts). 
173 See OWEN ET AL., supra note 21, at 167 (“Sexual misconduct complaints are routinely 
dismissed on dubious grounds. Investigations are often superficial and incomplete. And guards who 
sexually assault prisoners are rarely punished.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
174 See supra Part III. 
175 INSIDE THIS PLACE, supra note 24, at 234. 
176 That inmates often delay reporting makes the cases against guards more difficult to prove: 
Bringing criminal sex crime charges against corrections officers is rare and difficult. 
Inmates, fearful of retaliation, often wait weeks, months or longer to make an allegation, 
if they do so at all. When an inmate delays reporting, physical evidence has often 
disappeared, making the allegation a matter of the inmate’s word against the guard’s.” 
Goldstein, supra note 14; see also Human Rights Watch, supra note 76 (describing Georgia’s handling 
of criminal prosecutions of guards for sexually assaulting inmates: “In October and November 1992, 
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charges against prison guards and administrative personnel for sexual 
misconduct.177 While these cases can—and sometimes do—end in plea 
deals,178 bringing criminal charges may be a more effective deterrent of 
custodial sexual abuse than civil claims,179 many of which are dismissed for 
procedural defects before the merits can be assessed, and which may only 
result in liability for the prison employer or supervisor, as opposed to the 
individual guard.180 However, criminal cases also suffer from their own 
deficiencies in addressing guard-on-inmate sexual assault: prosecutorial 
discretion in bringing criminal charges and a hesitation to proceed with cases 
against prison personnel make criminal cases an unlikely and seldom-pursued 
form of recourse, even when procedurally possible.181 
While criminal claims are by no means a substitute for civil claims—indeed, 
pursuing both forms of relief may be preferable—criminal liability holds at 
least two advantages over civil claims. First, criminal charges are not governed 
by the PLRA, and therefore are not limited by the PLRA’s exhaustion, filing 
fee, physical injury, or three-strikes provisions.182 Second, statutes of 
limitations for criminal sexual assault claims are generally longer; in some 
states, there is no statute of limitations for felony sexual assault.183 
Criminal cases against prison guards for sexually assaulting female 
inmates have been brought successfully and resulted in prison sentences. For 
 
indictments were handed down against fourteen former GWCI or Colony Farm employees on state 
criminal law charges ranging from sodomy and sexual assault against a person in custody to rape. A 
fifteenth defendant was later indicted after DNA testing showed him to be the father of a prisoner’s 
baby . . . . Only two defendants were actually brought to trial on these charges, although two others 
pled guilty and were sentenced to terms of probation.”). 
177 Goldstein, supra note 14; see also Mike Deak, Fifth Edna Mahan Guard Charged with Sexual 
Assault, MYCENTRALJERSEY.COM (Aug. 17, 2017, 5:28 PM), http://www.mycentraljersey.com/
story/news/crime/2017/08/17/fifth-edna-mahan-guard-charged-sexual-assault/577992001/ 
[https://perma.cc/6S44-JLDH]; Eliott C. McLaughlin, Lawsuit Alleges Georgia Prison Supervisor Raped 
Women Inmates, CNN (Feb. 15, 2016, 9:42 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/15/us/georgia-prison-rapes-
lawsuit/index.html [https://perma.cc/R83M-4MH5]. 
178 See Jerry Iannelli, Miami Federal Prison Guard Gets Eight Months in Jail for Raping Inmate, MIAMI 
NEW TIMES (Nov. 15, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/miami-prison-guard-caught-
raping-inmate-sentenced-to-eight-months-in-jail-9831049 [https://perma.cc/28TN-PB87] (discussing a 
federal prison officer who pled guilty to raping an inmate and received an eight-month sentence). 
179 The relative magnitude of civil claims compared to criminal prosecutions likely results, at 
least in part, from the ability of prisoner-litigants to bring civil claims pro se. 
180 See supra Parts II–III, (discussing barriers to inmate-brought civil litigation and immunities 
from civil liability). 
181 Smith & Yarussi, supra note 73, at 20. 
182 See supra notes 93–124 and accompanying text (describing the PLRA and its effects on 
prisoner-filed civil litigation). 
183 See generally Brittany Ericksen & Ilse Knecht, Statutes of Limitations for Sexual Assault: A 
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example, in Commonwealth v. Black,184 appellant, a guard at Lackawanna 
County Prison, faced several sexual misconduct charges.185 Black pled guilty 
and was sentenced to up to eight years’ imprisonment and up to ten years’ 
“special probation.”186 On appeal, Black unsuccessfully challenged his 
sentence as unreasonable because it was beyond the sentencing guidelines’ 
recommendation.187 The Superior Court rejected Black’s arguments and 
upheld his prison sentence given the sentencing court’s consideration of 
the duration and length of time in which the crimes occurred; the number of 
victims; the need to deter similarly situated authority figures; the harm 
Appellant had done to the criminal justice system as a whole; and that 
Appellant had taken advantage of helpless women. These reasons are 
sufficient to sentence outside of the guidelines and in the aggravated range.188 
In a New Mexico case, former female inmates successfully brought criminal 
charges against prison guard Anthony Townes for multiple instances of sexual 
assault.189 In the underlying criminal case, Townes pled guilty to multiple counts 
of criminal sexual abuse and false imprisonment.190 Townes conceded that the 
factual allegations against him were true, “including that he had unlawfully 
restrained or confined Plaintiffs and caused them to engage in sexual intercourse 
while they were inmates and while he was in a position of authority over them and 
that he was able to use his authority to coerce Plaintiffs to submit to the acts.”191 
Here, the New Mexico Supreme Court also found Townes’ employer—the private 
correctional facility where he worked—and the prison warden vicariously civilly 
liable and responsible for the payment of all civil damage awards.192 
Similarly, the Texas case of Marilyn Shirley resulted in both a criminal 
conviction and a civil damages award.193 Shirley was serving a four-year prison 
sentence for a drug offense when guard Mike Miller raped her.194 She reported 
the assault to a prison official and produced the sweatpants she had been 
wearing that night, which had Miller’s DNA on them. In her civil case, Shirley 
won a four million dollar damages award against Miller, and he was sentenced 
 
184 No. 700 MDA 2016, 2016 WL 6876487 (Pa. Super. Ct. Nov. 22, 2016). 
185 Id. at *1. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at *2. 
188 Id. at *3. 
189 Spurlock v. Townes, 368 P.3d 1213, 1214 (N.M. 2016). 
190 Id. at 1215. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 1218-19. 
193 See Tony Cox, One Woman’s Story of Prison Rape, and Recovery, NPR (Mar. 21, 2007, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9032287 [https://perma.cc/PM58-QJQB] (describing 
how the FBI participated in the prison investigation, retrieving DNA evidence that assisted in the case). 
194 Id. 
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to over twelve years in prison on several counts of sexual misconduct.195 
 Yet another example of successful criminal prosecution of a prison guard 
for custodial sexual assault comes from the Sixth Circuit. In United States v. 
Smith, the Court of Appeals upheld a federal jury verdict convicting prison 
guard Eddie Smith of several sexual offenses against inmates at the Federal 
Medical Center in Kentucky.196 At his trial, victims testified about multiple 
instances of rape and forced sexual encounters.197 The jury convicted Smith on 
almost all counts, and he was sentenced to over twenty years’ imprisonment.198 
These cases demonstrate the potential for pursuing criminal prosecutions 
against male guards who sexually assault female inmates. While criminal 
liability is possible, it is by no means a complete or reliable cure for the defects 
of civil litigation. Criminal prosecutions have several shortcomings in the 
context of custodial sexual assault. First, accessing the criminal justice system 
is particularly hard for incarcerated persons. Unlike an assault victim outside of 
prison who can make a police report at any time, incarcerated women—like all 
inmates—are at the mercy of prison grievance processes, which have been 
documented to be ineffective and are only rarely pursued to the fullest extent 
possible.199 Furthermore, inmates have limited access to means of 
communication with those outside prison walls, which negatively impacts 
inmates’ abilities to report and bring attention to the abuses they suffer while 
incarcerated.200 In conjunction “with the extreme difficulty of litigating abuses 
in prison, this leaves prison officials free to . . . act largely with impunity.”201 
Second, prosecutorial discretion leaves many potential cases untried.202 In 
the sexual assault context, prosecutors hesitate to pursue cases due to a lack of 
evidence and conflicting accounts; these factors make sexual assault cases “high[-
]risk” prosecutions.203 Prosecutorial discretion limits custodial sexual assault 
cases in particular, due not only to lack of corroborating evidence, but also to 
biases against complaining witnesses who are or were incarcerated at the time of 
 
195 Id. 
196 United States v. Smith, No. 96-5385, 1998 WL 136564, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 19, 1998) (per 
curiam), aff ’d, 348 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 2003). 
197 Smith, 1998 WL 136564, at *1. 
198 Smith, 348 F.3d at 549. 
199 See supra notes 82–92 and accompanying text (discussing prison grievance processes); see 
also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 76 and accompanying text (noting the ineffectiveness of 
prison grievances). 
200 INSIDE THIS PLACE, supra note 24, at 255. 
201 Id. 
202 See Mary Graw Leary, Affirmatively Replacing Rape Culture with Consent Culture, 49 TEX. TECH 
L. REV. 1, 29 (2016) (“Prosecutors have the discretion to decide which cases will be charged and which 
will not.”); see also Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, The Failure of Consent: Re-Conceptualizing Rape As 
Sexual Abuse of Power, 18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 147, 179 (2011) (“Prosecutors are reluctant to pursue 
criminal charges in cases that are viewed as highly contested, controversial, and ambiguous.”). 
203 Smith & Yarussi, supra note 73, at 20. 
 
760 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 733 
their assault.204 Cases by female inmates against prison guards are especially 
challenging and thus unattractive to prosecute because of not only the inherent 
uphill battle of sexual assault cases generally, but also the problems of 
“unsympathetic victims, delayed reports of the assault, lack of physical evidence, 
poor investigations, and conflicting testimony” in the prison context in 
particular.205 Here, inmates are far from “ideal victims” of sexual assault;206 while 
“[t]he general public would not condone rape, . . . instead [the public] may 
typically accept it as part of prison life.”207 Juries may find inmates inherently 
untrustworthy due to their status as offenders.208 Furthermore, from a strategic 
perspective, prosecutors may be reluctant to bring charges against corrections 
personnel on whom “prosecutors must rely . . . to testify in . . . other criminal 
cases.”209 These challenges compound and make criminal prosecutions fewer and 
further between in the custodial sexual assault context.210 Because there is no pro 
se analog in the criminal justice system, the progression of an inmate’s criminal 
case against a guard depends not only on the pursuit of prison grievances, but 
also on a prosecutor’s willingness to take the case to court.211 
The burden of proof in criminal prosecutions also makes these cases 
tougher to bring successfully. A criminal case against a guard must meet the 
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, which is especially difficult where 
prosecutors have limited, if any, evidence other than a complaining victim’s 
testimony.212 Additionally, “timing often creates a problem for criminal 
prosecutions”213 when a prison grievance procedure has already taken place 
and the administrative investigation yielded findings in favor of the guard214 
or no further investigation at all due to lack of substantiation.215 
 
204 Id. 
205 Id.; see also id. at 23 (noting that the prison context, corroborating and physical evidence is 
often completely absent). 
206 Brenner et al., supra note 7, at 540 (“Prisoners face a societal brand of deviance that carries with it 
assumptions about their behavior because they committed a crime for which they are serving time. These 
assumptions are powerful enough to bar them from attaining the characteristics of ‘ideal victimhood.’”). 
207 Thompson, supra note 77, at 135; see also supra notes 62–70 and accompanying text 
(discussing credibility problems generally and their applicability to the prison context in particular). 
208 Smith & Yarussi, supra note 73, at 21. 
209 Id. at 20. 
210 See Santo, supra note 9 (noting that in forty-six percent of Texas cases involving inmates’ 
complaints of staff sexual abuse, prosecution was declined, and in nineteen percent of these cases, 
there was no indictment or the case was dismissed). 
211 Id. 
212 Smith & Yarussi, supra note 73, at 20-21. 
213 Id. at 21. 
214 Id. 
215 See McGuire, supra note 4 (“In the vast majority of cases that are not substantiated, prison 
officials conclude that there is not enough evidence to establish that the offense occurred.”); see also 
supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text (describing corroboration requirements). 
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Finally, there is the argument that given the ongoing and unmitigated 
nature of staff sexual abuse in women’s prisons,216 perhaps criminal cases are 
not powerful deterrents. Criminal charges have been brought against prison 
guards and resulted in sentences of imprisonment,217 but violence against 
incarcerated women has not abated.218 Indeed, without a shift in advocacy 
regarding—and attention to—the plight of incarcerated women at the hands 
of predatory guards, it might be that the wave of condemning sexual assault 
perpetrated by powerful men, and its potential deterrent effects, “cannot[] 
reverberate through prison walls.”219 
V. AN OPPORTUNITY FOR FEMINIST LEGAL ADVOCACY 
Given the failures of legislative reform and shortcomings of redress in the 
courts, what should be done about guards’ sexual assaults of incarcerated 
women? This problem is recognized, documented, and increasingly prevalent; 
existing legislation and legal remedies clearly have not fully addressed it.220 
While criminal prosecution may be a more promising avenue than civil 
litigation, it remains a rarely pursued and still imperfect remedy.221 Feminist 
legal advocacy—in courts and in coalitions more broadly—may be able to 
contribute to filling this void. Feminist legal advocacy does not provide a 
singular answer to the problem of custodial sexual assault,222 but three key 
proposals—statutory reform,223 prison abolition,224 and decriminalization of 
certain behaviors—will be addressed in turn. 
A. Statutory Reform: Politically Possible, Practically Ineffectual 
Prison reform agendas have historically focused on statutory and 
legislative change. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, most 
 
216 Supra notes 4–9 and accompanying text. 
217 See supra notes 189–198 and accompanying text (describing criminal cases against prison 
guards for sexually assaulting female inmates). 
218 See INSIDE THIS PLACE, supra note 24, at 232 (noting that BJS reports in response to PREA 
requirements “confirm the . . . finding of highly variable but persistent prevalence [of custodial sexual assault]”). 
219 Natasha Lennard, Will The Prison Rape Epidemic Ever Have Its Weinstein Moment?, THE 
INTERCEPT (Nov. 21, 2017, 4:08 PM), https://theintercept.com/2017/11/21/prison-rape-sexual-
assault-violence/ [https://perma.cc/U27W-J7TE]; see also supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text 
(describing current sexual assault cases receiving media attention). 
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even domestic violence issues.”). 
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224 Frank, supra note 13, at 23. 
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prison reformers were religiously and politically conservative, upper- and 
middle-class white women concerned with opening separate prisons for 
women.225 These “[e]arly reformers believed that sex was at the root of the 
problems that brought women into conflict with the law.”226 
More recent statute-based prison reform has maintained the conservative 
base of earlier movements. The PREA was itself “spearheaded by human rights, 
faith-based, and prison rape victims’ advocacy groups” and “largely . . . 
attributed to growing conservative concerns about homosexuality and the spread 
of AIDS . . . .”227 Couching an end to prison sexual abuse as a way to eliminate 
sexual relations—and consequences of those relations—that conservatives in 
particular found undesirable effectively made the PREA “politically salient for 
the Republican-dominated Congress” in power in the early 2000s.228 
Despite the effectiveness of coalitions and political support in passing the 
PREA, the law itself has clearly failed to result in any measurable decline in—
let alone an end to—custodial sexual abuse.229 The PREA’s ineffectiveness 
stems not only from its lack of “teeth” to combat custodial sexual assault 
meaningfully, but in its failure to consult those most familiar with prison 
conditions and administration.230 To the extent that passing the PREA involved 
coalition building, the resulting coalition was not representative of the key 
 
225 Smith, supra note 27, at 198. 
226 Id.; see also McGuire, supra note 4 (“Progressive-era reformers, who were mostly white, 
upper class women, advocated changes designed to protect female inmates from predatory and 
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227 Lisa Pasko, Damaged Daughters: The History of Girls’ Sexuality and the Juvenile Justice System, 
100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1099, 1125 (2010); see also Brenda V. Smith, The Prison Rape 
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these issues.”). However, some authors characterize this coalition as more politically diverse. See 
Marie Gottschalk, Dismantling the Carceral State: The Future of Penal Policy Reform, 84 TEX. L. REV. 
1693, 1737 (2006) (noting that the PREA “was the result of a remarkable coalition of advocacy groups 
ranging from conservative organizations, like Focus on the Family, the Christian Coalition, and the 
Hudson Institute, to civil and human rights groups”). 
228 Smith, supra note 227, at 11; see also INSIDE THIS PLACE, supra note 24, at 234 (noting “[t]he 
advocacy movement that spurred the passage of state laws criminalizing all sexual conduct between 
custodial officials and prisoners.”). 
229 See Frank, supra note 13, at 13 (“PREA is not simply a law without teeth, but one without 
stakes. It acknowledges that it cannot mandate compliance, and even, if it could, compliance would 
have an immeasurable effect.”). 
230 Id.; see also Smith, supra note 227, at 11 (noting that “correctional actors . . . were caught unaware 
by the passage of PREA” and that “PREA’s initial proponents did not involve established advocates and 
litigators who had primarily litigated and worked on issues of sexual abuse of women in custody.”). 
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stakeholders in this arena; ultimately, there was a fundamental disconnect 
between the words of the legislation and the realities on the ground.231 
Suggestions sounding in legislative reform include introducing a statutory 
scheme that works to prevent sexual assault and offer redress when it does occur. 
This plan would aim to prevent custodial sexual assault by, for example, 
suspending terms of incarceration “if the person sentenced is highly likely to be 
unlawfully sexually assaulted in detention or has actually been unlawfully sexually 
assaulted in detention,” and creating a presumption that all incarcerated women 
are at an increased risk of sexual assault.232 Other parts of the proposed statutory 
scheme would include measures to mitigate sexual assault by ending solitary 
confinement, cracking down on retaliation for reporting sexual assault, and 
compensate victims of custodial sexual violence with monetary damages.233 
The problem with this approach, however, is operationalizing it. Statutory 
schemes like the PREA have already proven to be ineffective. It is not clear 
what further regulation would achieve or that state governments would 
comply with monetary damage awards absent civil litigation demanding such 
judgments.234 While the PREA and PLRA were politically popular,235 
statutory enforcement has been lacking,236 and efforts at reform have been 
empty.237 Furthermore, it is unclear if future statute-based reform would be 
more inclusive of those who are familiar with prison sexual violence, let alone 
anyone who has experienced sexual assault while incarcerated. This approach 
would likely replicate the problems and pitfalls of the PREA. 
B. Ending the Carceral State? 
Another possibility is to make mass incarceration central to the feminist 
legal-advocacy agenda and to end women’s prisons in particular.238 As Victoria 
 
231 Supra notes 109–118 and accompanying text (noting the failure of the PLRA to define 
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Law posits, the “carceral variant of feminism continues to be the predominant 
form. While its adherents would likely reject the descriptor, carceral 
feminism describes an approach that sees increased policing, prosecution, and 
imprisonment as the primary solution to violence against women.”239 The 
approach of carceral feminism has been criticized for excluding the voices of 
women most likely to be affected by incarceration: women of color.240 
Commentators also point out the inherent tension between ending violence 
against women through “increasing policing, prosecution, and incarceration” 
rates and ending incarceration of women more generally.241 
An extreme approach advanced by some advocates is to end women’s prisons 
entirely. The crux of the argument is that without any such facilities, there would 
be no opportunity for custodial sexual assault of incarcerated women.242 Advocates 
in favor of this approach note the “extreme violence, dehumanization, racialized 
degradation and indignity” to which inmates are subject.243 Because prisons “cannot 
reasonably guarantee incarcerated women will be free from sexual victimization” 
and such “substantial danger of sexual victimization is unconscionable,” the 
argument goes, no female correctional facility should remain.244 Prison abolition 
advocates see the closure of all-female correctional facilities as a precursor to ending 
most, if not all, modes of incarceration more generally.245 
While this approach would eliminate the opportunity for custodial sexual 
assault of female inmates, it does not seem to be a realistic solution. Prison 
abolition would be a radical departure from prevailing modes of social order and 
criminal justice; it would require, in sum, “a very different social landscape.”246 
Indeed, the call for prison abolition “is an aspirational ethical, institutional, and 
political framework that aims to fundamentally reconceptualize security and 
collective social life, rather than simply a plan to tear down prison walls.”247 It is 
difficult to imagine a time where arguing for the end of prisons would be a 
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politically expedient or popular agenda; the carceral system is “deeply 
entrenched” in the fabric of American social and political life.248 
C. Noncriminal Alternatives and Decriminalization 
The third and final approach addressed here is the middle ground between 
statutory reform on the one hand, and wholesale institutional and 
sociocultural reconceptualization on the other. Noncriminal alternatives 
reject using the state or criminal justice system, but instead focus on 
decriminalizing certain behaviors, addressing underlying sociocultural and 
economic disparities, and utilizing restorative justice in lieu of criminal 
sanctions to address interpersonal and domestic violence.249 The objective of 
this strategy is to reduce the number of women in prison. This advocacy is 
not directed at ending or reforming prisons, but the effect of decriminalizing 
drug-related and nonviolent offenses for which most incarcerated women are 
serving time, along with ending mandatory-arrest and no-drop domestic 
violence policies,250 may be to reduce the number of women who are 
incarcerated, and in turn, reduce incidents of custodial sexual violence.251 
Noncriminal alternatives that could address custodial sexual violence are 
those that keep women out of prisons ex ante. These reforms aim to answer 
the shortcomings and criticisms of carceral feminism by disrupting cycles of 
violence that are largely responsible for landing women in prison. People who 
are incarcerated are more likely than the general population to have faced 
sexual abuse or violence during childhood or their adult lives before prison.252 
This is especially true for women who are incarcerated. As the editors of 
Inside This Place, Not of It note, 
One of the most striking things about our experience in collecting these 
narratives has been the overwhelming prevalence of histories of sexual abuse. 
According to the U.S. Department of Justice, two-thirds of women in prison 
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have experienced sexual and physical abuse in their lives, a statistic that was 
reflected in our interviews.”253  
Studies have found linkages between past sexual trauma, interpersonal 
violence, and incarceration.254 Perhaps addressing the ongoing problems of sexual 
and interpersonal violence will reduce alcohol and drug problems in women, which 
are among the most common causes for the surging female inmate population.255 
More intersectional, diverse coalitions taking aim at sexual and domestic 
violence in its myriad forms might also break cycles of violence that result in 
victims of abuse being imprisoned. Criminalizing domestic and interpersonal 
violence has resulted in negative consequences and sometimes criminal 
punishments for women victims.256 At present, the response to domestic and 
interpersonal violence is “arrest, prosecution, and punishment” in the form of 
no-drop prosecution policies and mandatory arrests when reports are made to 
police.257 This approach has been sharply criticized by feminist legal advocates 
who note that women of color are both reluctant to involve police and are more 
likely to face consequences as a result of mandatory-arrest policies.258 Feminist 
legal advocates have argued that victims should, at the very least, retain more 
autonomy after domestic-violence-related arrest is made; removing the victim’s 
agency in this process can be revictimizing.259 Instead, “experimenting with 
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alternative approaches for dealing with violence against women and other 
crimes, such as restorative justice programs,”260 and community-based peer-
mentorship initiatives, may be more successful than mandatory, state-sanctioned 
penal responses that can have negative consequences for female victims.261 
Reducing the female prison population would require the decriminalization 
of drug offenses and other nonviolent crimes for which most women are serving 
time.262 Drug-related offenses, along with “immigration violations and 
nonviolent . . . offenses,” are the largest contributors to female inmate 
population growth.263 Many female offenders are “the unwitting or reluctant 
accomplices to abusive partners,”264 or develop drug habits in response to past 
abuse or sexual victimization, committing drug or property-related crimes to 
feed their addictions.265 Therefore, decriminalizing minor drug and property-
related offenses—along with more autonomous forms of redress for 
interpersonal violence—could interrupt destructive cycles that lead women to 
prison and reduce the number of incarcerated women on the whole. 
The first step to decreasing female inmate populations is decriminalization 
of minor drug offenses. Several states have already decriminalized marijuana 
possession.266 By contrast, wholesale decriminalization of domestic violence is 
 
justice system . . . . The effect of mandatory policies, however, may be to strip the 
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not feasible: criminal responses are an entrenched mode of dealing with 
violent offenses generally, and domestic violence in the United States in 
particular.267 Perhaps instead of the total decriminalization of domestic 
violence, shifting the mode of criminalization by giving victims more agency 
over their cases and doing away with mandatory arrest and prosecution 
policies could be a politically salient and practicable middle ground.268 As Aya 
Gruber succinctly concludes, “the trend towards addressing the problem of 
domestic violence through criminal law will likely continue, and feminists in 
the legal arena will not be able simply to ignore the criminal system.”269 
In conjunction with combatting sexual and interpersonal violence in all its 
forms through noncriminal means, and decriminalization of nonviolent 
offenses, is an advocacy opportunity—or perhaps, a necessary precondition—
to demand better and fairer access to resources for communities of color and 
women in particular that would help to break cycles of abuse and 
incarceration.270 Creating access to more equal education, fair housing, higher-
wage jobs and professional career opportunities is yet another solution that 
will require addressing systemic inequalities.271 Because most incarcerated 
women are women of color,272 and communities of color “continue to have the 
worst schools, the fewest job opportunities, and the least affordable 
housing[,]”273 addressing these inequalities over time would go a long way to 
reducing crime rates, and in turn, the female prison population. 
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D. A Way Forward? 
The most promising of these solutions is a hybridized version: shifting the 
focus of criminalization to decriminalize nonviolent offenses and in turn, end 
mass incarceration as it currently exists, while meaningfully and consistently 
punishing perpetrators of custodial sexual violence. At first glance, it may 
appear inconsistent to argue for decriminalization on one hand while 
considering criminal sanctions for guards who sexually assault female inmates 
on the other. What is required is a shift in which behaviors are criminalized and 
who is imprisoned. Ending mass incarceration in its current form—by 
advocating for the decriminalization of minor nonviolent offenses and 
supporting bottom-up, community-based initiatives and access to resources to 
break cycles of violence, including the end of no-drop and mandatory-
prosecution policies—is a worthwhile pursuit of feminist legal advocates, but it 
does not necessarily mean ending all incarceration or incarceration for every 
offense. Furthermore, to the extent that sexual and interpersonal violence 
outside of prison remains criminalized, ending no-drop and mandatory-arrest 
policies but retaining criminal liability in a less coercive form limits the 
involvement of the state while still allowing a victim to pursue criminal charges; 
this can be analogized to the custodial context insofar as an inmate-victim must 
first report sexual abuse and undertake grievance procedures in order for a 
criminal case to even potentially ensue. Decriminalizing offenses that 
disproportionately target poor communities and communities of color while 
holding male guards—who are generally non-minorities—responsible for 
committing sexual abuse is a reasonable way forward, and would accomplish 
dual goals of decreasing female prison populations while still holding 
accountable those who sexually violate incarcerated women. 
As noted, most women are incarcerated for nonviolent, drug-related 
offenses.274 Decriminalizing these violations—and rethinking the so-called 
“war on drugs” and the enforcement of its policies—would go a long way to 
reduce the number of women in prison.275 This would also likely change the 
racial makeup of prisons, since “blacks are nearly four times as likely as whites 
to be arrested for drug offenses and 2.5 times as likely to be arrested for drug 
possession.”276 While prisons may not ever be wholly abolished in the United 
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States, decreasing prison populations is a worthwhile goal that would, at the 
very least, shrink the number of victims of custodial sexual abuse.277 
Furthermore, making criminal sanctions for reports of domestic violence 
optional, as opposed to a process of mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution 
that denies victims meaningful agency, may also decrease prison populations.278 
Reorienting what and who is criminalized can be consistent with feminist 
legal advocacy agendas; disfavoring mass incarceration and advocating for goals 
that would effectively spell its end do not equate to decriminalizing all forms 
of violence.279 Some feminist legal advocates continue to urge for the criminal 
punishment of those who sexually assault or physically violate women.280 Male 
guards who sexually abuse female inmates arguably fall into the narrow “terrible 
few” for whom carceral punishment is required.281 Ending mass incarceration 
does not necessarily mean ending all incarceration, unless the end of mass 
incarceration is equated with complete prison abolition, which, as discussed, is 
an unlikely outcome.282 However, ending mass incarceration can mean 
decreasing prison populations, which decriminalizing the underlying offenses 
for which most women are incarcerated in the first place would achieve.283 
One could argue that there is tension in advocating for decriminalization 
of the behaviors that land many women in prison while still criminalizing 
sexual assault committed by guards upon female inmates. There are a few 
responses to this criticism. First, as demonstrated here, the prison context is 
fundamentally different; the power dynamics at play, compounded by racial 
and gender hierarchies, as well as the particular inability of incarcerated 
women to seek redress for the harms they suffer in prison, makes criminal 
liability for guards who sexually assault inmates one of the limited ways to 
address this problem. Indeed, as one author has noted, the “location of this 
violence and the identity of the victim” sets the custodial sexual assault 
context apart from other forms of violence against women and the movements 
dedicated to addressing those iterations of violence.284 Approaches to curbing 
and eventually ending guards’ sexual abuse of incarcerated women, therefore, 
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cannot neatly borrow from other forms of antiviolence advocacy that wholly 
condemn or encourage criminal sanctions as a mode of redress.285 
Second, there is a distinction to be made between 1) decriminalizing minor, 
nonviolent offenses and rethinking mandatory arrests and prosecution for 
domestic violence disputes and 2) prosecuting guard-on-inmate sexual assault: 
criminalizing the former has been a form of “support[ing] social hierarchies 
related to race and gender,” in that those offenses disproportionately affect the 
lives of people of color,286 while underlying the criminalization of the latter is 
a reluctance to recognize violence committed by white men against women of 
color.287 This hybrid approach thus avoids the pitfalls of relatively extreme 
advocacy—that for total prison abolition and ends to all forms of 
criminalization, which seem unlikely at best—while retaining the practicality 
of approaches that have already taken root, such as decriminalizing minor drug 
offenses.288 Similarly, reframing mandatory-arrest and no-drop prosecution 
policies as options, rather than obligations, maintains criminalization of 
violence when sought by victims, rather than when coerced by the state.289 
It is not inconsistent to advocate for the decriminalization of what results 
in women’s incarceration ex ante while arguing for accountability for the harms 
they suffer while in prison ex post. Feminist legal advocates should focus on 
reducing women’s prison populations to the extent feasible. But assuming that 
women’s prisons will continue to exist, given the unlikelihood of total prison 
abolition in the United States, custodial sexual assault will also persist.290 
Therefore, feminist legal advocates can argue for an end to mass incarceration 
while still favoring some incarceration, namely that of guards who sexually 
abuse and violate female inmates. The fundamental difference is who is 
incarcerated and for what offense; taking seriously incarcerated women’s 
accounts of sexual abuse in prison and consistently holding their abusers 
criminally accountable would be a marked departure from the status quo.291 
Feminist legal advocacy in this arena need not be zero sum. Advocacy 
agendas that aim to decrease prison populations in the long run implicitly seek 
to end custodial sexual assault, but advocates concerned with the prevalence of 
sexual violence in women’s prisons must also contend with the current realities 
of the problem. Criminalizing guards’ sexual assaults of female inmates may 
provide an imperfect-yet-possible short-term advocacy opportunity for those 
who both want to end this form of sexual violence and who, taking the long view, 
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seek to decrease prison populations on the whole. To the degree that custodial 
sexual assault is criminalized, a more concrete avenue for feminist legal advocacy 
to explore in the immediate future is better training of prosecutors handling 
inmates’ criminal sexual assault complaints against guards. In their report, Smith 
and Yarussi note that “prosecutors are not sufficiently knowledgeable about 
prisons, prison culture or correctional practices. Federal investigators also felt 
that prosecutors did not have sufficient knowledge of issues such as the coercive 
influence of contraband on sex and security in the institution.”292 A 
straightforward solution would be to require state and federal prosecutors—or 
representatives of any prosecutor’s office who would be handling prisoner 
complaints—to attend trainings on how to respond to the particular sensitivities 
and procedural hurdles of these cases. This would inherently require addressing 
and breaking down stereotypically held notions of inmates as unreliable victims 
whose complaints against guards cannot be trusted.293 
Feminist legal advocacy as it pertains to custodial sexual assault can avoid 
the pitfalls of earlier prison reform movements by including the voices of 
communities most affected by incarceration—communities of color generally 
and those who are or were incarcerated in particular.294 Multiple advocacy 
groups are already engaged in combating mass incarceration in general and the 
challenges faced by incarcerated women in particular. 295 Some of these 
projects not only cater to incarcerated women, but are created by them.296 
Thus, the challenge will be for “mainstream” feminist legal advocacy—and the 
law more generally—to adopt these attitudes and take seriously incarcerated 
women’s narratives, lived experiences, and complaints of sexual violence 
perpetrated by those tasked with protecting them. Sexual violence in prison 
does not have to be an “inevitable” reality;297 in particular, male guards 
committing acts of sexual violence against female inmates does not have to be 
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a defining feature of U.S. correctional facilities. But making accountability an 
accessible avenue for inmate-victims—thus ending the impunity that marks 
this specific type of sexual abuse—remains an open challenge.298 
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